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The International Competition Network:
Its Past, Current and Future Role
Hugh M. Hollman* & William E. Kovacic**
I. INTRODUCTION***
In October 2001, on the occasion of Fordham Law School’s
annual international antitrust conference in New York City,
fourteen competition agencies announced the creation of the
International Competition Network (ICN).1 The new venture
joined a field of multinational competition networks that
already included the Competition Law and Policy Committee
(CLPC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the Competition Law and Consumer
Policies Branch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and an initiative under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) to explore the preparation of an
international system of competition law standards.2 Given the
scope of the existing networks and the effort needed to support
them (most ICN founders also participated in the OECD,
* Hugh M. Hollman is Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Kovacic at the
Federal Trade Commission, and a member of the ICN’s Agency Effectiveness
Working Group.
** William E. Kovacic is a Commissioner at the US Federal Trade
Commission, Professor, George Washington University Law School (on leave),
and Vice Chair for Outreach of the ICN.
*** The authors would like to thank Rebecca Bianchi for her invaluable
research assistance We received generous guidance from Russell Damtoft,
Elizabeth Kraus, Randy Tritell, and Maria Coppola. We also have benefitted
from conversations with Sean Ennis, John Fingleton, Hillary Jennings,
Frederic Jenny, Joe Phillips, Hassan Qaqaya, Ulla Schweger, and Jeremy
West. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and not those of the Federal
Trade Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the ICN.
1. U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition
Network (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/icn.shtm.
2. See Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Comm. to the Attorney General:
Antitrust Div., FINAL REPORT 281–302 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC REPORT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (discussing what
a new international network of competition agencies could add to work already
performed by existing bodies).
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UNCTAD, and WTO programs), it was reasonable to wonder
whether the undertaking would be sustainable.
In major respects, the new network not only has survived
but prospered. Today, as its tenth anniversary approaches, the
ICN’s membership has grown to 114 members, which
collectively represent nearly all of the world’s jurisdictions with
competition laws.3 The organization’s efforts have yielded
important contributions to the development of widely accepted
international competition policy norms,4 and its annual
meeting has become perhaps the single most important annual
gathering of competition agency leaders. More broadly, the ICN
exemplifies the form of voluntary multinational collaboration
that commentators have identified as a promising way to
facilitate
international
ordering
amid
the
global
decentralization and diversification of economic regulation.5
The arrival of ICN’s tenth anniversary offers an
appropriate juncture to take stock of ICN’s achievements, to
consider why the ICN has succeeded thus far in many of its
aims, and to ask what comes next. In general, the ICN’s
paramount goal is to facilitate convergence on superior
approaches concerning the substance, procedure, and
administration of competition law. To achieve this aim, the ICN
engages in projects that seek to (1) increase understanding of
individual competition systems, including similarities and
3. Interview with John Fingleton, Chair of the Steering Group of the
International Competition Network (ICN), 25 ANTITRUST 71 (2010)
[hereinafter Fingleton Interview] (reviewing ICN membership data). ICN
membership is available to national competition agencies. Thus, some
jurisdictions with multiple agencies have more than one representative in the
ICN. For example, the US Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the US Department of Justice are both ICN members, as are the
Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading from the United
Kingdom. The most notable jurisdiction with a competition law and no
representation in the ICN is China, which has three national competition
agencies (MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC). China participates in the work of the
OECD Competition Committee as an observer and is a member of UNCTAD.
The Chinese agencies have not discussed their intentions concerning ICN
membership. As mentioned below, see infra text accompanying note 113,
China’s participation in the ICN is an important determinant of the
organization’s future success.
4. See Int’l Competition Network, ICN WORK PRODUCTS CATALOGUE
available
at
(Sept.
2010)
[hereinafter
ICN WORK PRODUCTS]
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc667.pdf.
5. For the best known work advancing this theme, see generallyANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). For a useful review of the
future path for these international endeavors, see David Ziring, Three
Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAWYER 211 (2009).
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differences among them, (2) identify and build consensus about
superior practices, and (3) encourage individual jurisdictions to
opt in to superior techniques. Other international networks
make useful contributions toward convergence, but the ICN
prides itself on having a stronger capacity to promote broad
adoption of global standards.
The ICN pursues convergence with the expectation that if
competition systems around the world opt in to superior
techniques, they will achieve greater progress toward
dismantling competitive restraints within single jurisdictions
and across borders. In a number of areas, the ICN’s effort to
encourage greater convergence upon substantive norms,
procedural standards, and operational techniques seems to
have achieved its aims. To put the point cautiously, we have
seen growth in the number of competition policy systems that
embody the ICN’s Recommended Best Practices.6 However, the
full extent of adherence to the network’s recommended
practices remains unclear.
In this Article we consider what comes next for the ICN.
Where can it make the greatest contribution to the
development of sensible international competition policy
standards? Can the ICN be effective if it continues to exist in
its current form as a purely virtual network, or will the
institution acquire more of the attributes—for example, a
formal, stand-alone secretariat—that one associates with older,
intergovernmental organizations such as OECD and UNCTAD?
How can the ICN best serve a large, diverse membership that
features extensive variation with respect to national
circumstances and experience with competition law? Could the
ICN perhaps serve as the platform for the development of
regional or multinational agreements? How should the ICN
interact with the OECD, UNCTAD, and other multinational
bodies involved in competition policy? And, perhaps most
ambitiously, can the ICN facilitate progress toward the
establishment of a mechanism for the application of
international competition law, including dispute resolution?
Our examination of the ICN’s experience and our attempts to
6. Int’l Competition Network, A STATEMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS
APRIL 2010, 3–4 (Apr. 2010) (discussing impact of ICN’s mergerrelated recommended practices), available at www.internationalcompetitionne
OF
twork.org/uploads/library/doc630.pdf
[hereinafter
STATEMENT
ACHIEVEMENTS]; see, e.g., ICN WORK PRODUCTS, supra note 4, at 10 (setting
out recommended practices developed by ICN’s Merger Working Group).
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answer these questions may assist other international
networks of public bodies in deciding how to carry out programs
in other fields of policy.
The ICN’s current leadership is engaged in an intensive
examination of the network’s future.7 We seek to inform
discussion about the ICN’s future by offering a way to think of
its institutional characteristics, to assess its relative
advantages by comparison to other multinational competition
networks, and by proposing specific steps for the organization
to consider going ahead. In our view, the challenges for the ICN
and its members are to preserve institutional attributes that
have worked well, to achieve a fuller integration of effort with
the OECD and UNCTAD, to strengthen the network’s capacity
to identify and serve its members’ needs, and to continue to set
a foundation that could support the development of a system of
global competition rules.
All of what we suggest must be accomplished amid extreme
pressure upon agencies to reduce costs. The expansion of
competition policy systems creates a special urgency to make
these and similar investments that build an effective
framework of international standards and cooperation, yet
these infrastructure-like expenditures often are the first to go
amid demands to curb public budgets.
To consider a course for the ICN’s second decade, we focus
mainly on the development and operation of the network since
its creation in October 2001. In doing so, we write from the
perspective of a government agency (the US Federal Trade
Commission) that was one of the network’s fourteen founding
members and has participated actively in the design of the
network’s programs and processes. We sketch the ICN’s
origins, but we emphasize experience with implementation. It
required true foresight over a decade ago to see the value of
creating another multinational initiative to address policy
concerns that already commanded the attention of the OECD,
UNCTAD, and the WTO. Once the commitment to form the
ICN was made in 2000–01, it was not inevitable that it would
emerge as a useful instrument to improve global competition
policy. Following the launch, skillful implementation counted
for everything. Experience with the ICN’s development since
October 2001 supplies important lessons about the network’s
future.
7. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (describing ICN Second
Decade initiative).
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II. CONVERGENCE: MEANING AND METHODS
To provide context for studying the ICN’s experience, we
first define “convergence”—the main objective that motivated
the ICN’s creation and sustains its operations today. By
convergence we mean the broad acceptance of standards
concerning the substantive doctrine and analytical methods of
competition law, the procedures for applying substantive
commands, and the methods for administering a competition
agency. Administration encompasses the techniques a
competition agency uses to organize its operations, set
priorities, and evaluate its effectiveness.
Convergence as we see it does not anticipate the
establishment of identical policies and enforcement
mechanisms across the world’s competition policy systems.
Complete uniformity—which we associate with the term
“harmonization”—is probably unattainable.8 Variations in the
economic conditions, history, legal process (e.g., civil law versus
common law), and political science of individual jurisdictions
are enduring sources of difference among competition systems.
Nor do we think the pursuit of absolute congruence to be
desirable. As described below, the development of competition
law is inherently evolutionary and experimental.9 Since the
first national legislation in Canada and the United States in
the late nineteenth century, competition law standards have
changed as a function of many forces, especially advances in
industrial organization economics. Progress in implementation
often takes place as individual jurisdictions test new
approaches—for
example,
the
substantive
analytical
framework introduced in the US Department of Justice (DOJ)
Merger Guidelines of 1982 and the DOJ’s leniency reforms of
the 1990s, which supplied powerful incentives for cartel
participants to inform the government of their illegal
behavior.10 These and other improvements in competition
policy have occurred in a sequence of experimentation by which
individual jurisdictions introduce reforms, gain experience, and
8. This discussion draws upon the framework set out in William E.
Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States:
Convergence or Divergence?, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS
ON FROM THE TREATY OF ROME 314 (Xavier Vives ed., 2009).
9. See infra pp. 311–12 (describing the evolutionary character of
competition law).
10. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 87–163 (describing importance of
1982 DOJ merger guidelines and leniency policies introduced in 1990s).
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assess results. Successful implementation induces other
jurisdictions to emulate the reforms. To insist upon full
uniformity across systems, or await unanimous approval before
any single system undertook an innovation, would rob
competition policy of a valuable source of continuing renewal
and vitality. An objective we ascribe to the ICN and its two
intergovernmental network counterparts is to realize the
benefits of standardization without losing the useful innovation
that comes from decentralized experimentation.
While we do not anticipate or prefer programs to achieve
total congruence across systems, we see great value in spurring
convergence as we described the concept above. Some
standardization with respect to substantive standards,
procedure, and administration serves two useful ends.
Widespread adoption of superior practices improves the
performance of individual jurisdictions (by moving them from
weaker to stronger approaches) and increases the effectiveness
of competition policy as a form of global endeavor (by increasing
the capacity of competition agencies as a group, through
individual initiative and cross-border cooperation, to deter
harmful business conduct). This is the rough equivalent of the
process in medicine through which broad acceptance of superior
treatments or surgical techniques improves the quality of
health within and across jurisdictions.
When better methods become available, society has a
strong stake in their rapid and extensive adoption. To put the
point in a negative form, there may be substantial harm if a
jurisdiction persists in using manifestly inferior analytical
approaches, procedures, or techniques for the administration of
a competition agency. For example, adherence to badly
conceived substantive tests not only can retard economic
progress within a single jurisdiction, it can damage economic
performance in other jurisdictions. If a country that applies an
inferior approach is economically significant, companies doing
business in global or regional trade may feel compelled to
conform their practices to satisfy the demands of the single
jurisdiction. These and other adverse spillovers give the larger
community of nations a keen interest in the quality of the
competition systems of individual countries.
Standardization also can reduce unnecessary costs
associated with antitrust enforcement. Such costs can arise, for
example, from subjecting mergers to multiple individual
national reviews, where each involves needlessly idiosyncratic
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reporting requirements or where notification obligations sweep
in transactions with little connection to commerce within a
jurisdiction. Standardization which simplifies the review
process—such as by enabling the merging parties to use a
common form to report a proposed deal to numerous
authorities—can reduce the costs of commerce without
diminishing the quality of regulatory oversight.
The potential benefits of convergence become more
apparent as the complexity of global competition policy
increases. For most of the twentieth century, few jurisdictions
had competition laws, and still fewer had effective programs to
enforce them.11 As late as the mid-1970s, only Germany, the
European Union (EU), and the US had undertaken significant
enforcement programs that commanded attention from
business managers.12 With the fall of the Soviet Union and the
adoption of market-oriented reforms by countries previously
committed to central economic planning, many nations enacted
competition laws or revived older, dormant antitrust statutes.
Today, at least 112 jurisdictions have competition laws.13
To spur convergence across this multitude of systems
requires an understanding of the process of regulatory
standardization and a vision of how a network of competition
agencies, such as the ICN, can promote broad adoption of
superior techniques. Since 2001, the ICN’s leadership has
formulated a strategy that suggests how the network can best
promote convergence in a global environment that features a
broad
decentralization
of
authority
and
extensive
experimentation.14
11. See William E. Kovacic, Dominance, Duopoly and Oligopoly: The
United States and the Development of Global Competition Policy, 13 GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV. (2010) (reviewing trends in development of systems of
competition law).
12. Id.
13. John Fingleton, The International Competition Network: Planning for
the Second Decade, Address at the Ninth Annual Conference in Istanbul,
Turkey (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches
/689752/0410.pdf [hereinafter Second Decade Speech].
14. The strategy we refer to here is an amalgam of views expressed by
members of the ICN Steering Committee from the first years of the network’s
establishment to the present. Two particularly formative statements are
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Competition Agencies in a
Market-Based Global Economy, Address at the Annual Lecture of the
European Foreign Affairs Review (July 23, 2002), available at
www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723brussels.shtm [hereinafter EFA Speech]
and Fingleton, Second Decade Speech, supra note 13.
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As articulated by agency officials who have played major
roles in the ICN’s early development and subsequent
operations,15 international standardization in competition law
is likely to unfold in three stages. The first is continuing,
decentralized experimentation as individual jurisdictions test
different substantive rules, analytical methods, procedures,
and administrative techniques. The second stage is the
identification of superior practices. In the third stage, countries
voluntarily opt in to superior practices. General satisfaction
with a particular standard may create a willingness by nations
to embrace the standard and to embody within a treaty or other
form of international obligation.
With this framework in mind, how can an international
network such as the ICN promote the adoption of superior
standards? The ICN convergence strategy has four basic
elements. The first is to increase understanding of the origins
and operations of individual systems. The ICN does this mainly
by serving as a convenor which engages its members—through
its annual conference, through workshops, and through regular
teleconferences—in regular discussions about existing practice
within jurisdictions. This process illuminates similarities in
substantive analysis and procedure across jurisdictions and
deepens awareness of the sources of differences.
Fuller understanding of system similarities and differences
sets the foundation for ICN’s second contribution, which is to
identify superior practices. Some approaches may readily stand
out as superior once nations understand their application and
grasp their effectiveness. Consensus about other practices may
come about only after a longer process of discussion.
The quality of consensus depends heavily on the methods
15. Two agency leaders stand out. One is Timothy Muris, who chaired the
US Federal Trade Commission from June 2001 to August 2004. Muris
committed substantial FTC resources to the ICN’s development and supplied
an influential conceptual framework for understanding how the ICN could
encourage adoption of superior techniques. See, e.g., EFA Speech, supra note
14 (describing ICN’s possible contributions to the identification of superior
practices). A professor of contract law and competition law, Muris pointed to
the development of the Uniform Commercial Code in the US as a rough model
for the work of the ICN. Id. John Fingleton, the current Chair of the ICN’s
Steering Committee, is a second major source of thinking about the possible
contributions of the ICN. Through initiatives such as the ICN Second Decade
project, Fingleton has been instrumental in identifying ways in which the ICN
can best serve the functions of education, consensus building, and
implementation of superior techniques. See, e.g., Second Decade Speech, supra
note 13.
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used to achieve it. One major determinant of the perceived
quality of consensus is the breadth and intensity of
participation by the network’s members. A network’s value as a
source of widely-accepted standards increases as the number of
participating jurisdictions grows. To fulfill its intended role, the
ICN requires broad participation by competition agencies from
well-established market economies and transition economies
alike. The imperative to achieve inclusive membership raises a
dilemma. Most of the resources (notably, the time of top
management and skilled staff) to support a network’s
operations ordinarily reside in older, more experienced, and
better funded agencies. Without the resource commitment of
the wealthier jurisdictions, the ICN would collapse.
At the same time, the magnitude of contributions (and,
implicitly, control) by older, wealthier competition systems may
raise doubts among less experienced and less wealthy
jurisdictions that the network truly serves their interests.
Based on other experiences in international relations, weaker
states may see the multinational network as simply another
venue in which more powerful nations trample them.16
A second issue concerns participation by non-government
advisors (NGAs) who come from academia, companies,
consumer groups, economic consultancies, and law firms. NGAs
can improve the quality of a network by, among other ways,
providing information that public officials lack and in assisting
in the implementation of standards proposed by the network.17
They also can supply important contributions to the routine
16. In discussing the development of international norms in other areas of
public policy, Professor Julie Mertus puts the point this way: “[P]owerful state
and nonstate leaders from western countries overpower their nonwestern
counterparts at world conferences. These leaders use their positions of
authority in already-established transboundary networks to set the agenda,
and they use their access to language and diplomacy skills to work that
agenda to serve their own interests.” Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate
Actors in the New Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm
Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 537, 541–42
(2000).
17. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–75 (1997) (discussing
potential benefits of NGO involvement in international organizations). For
example, one form of knowledge uniquely within the hands of business
enterprises and their advisors is information about the costs of complying with
multiple merger reporting requirements. Another illustration is the
information that academic researchers have assembled in the course of
studying the process of international cooperation and convergence in various
fields of public policy.
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work of a network’s committees or working groups—for
example, by conducting research or preparing background
papers.18
Where NGAs participate in a network’s proceedings (as
they do extensively in the ICN), attaining a suitable mix of
perspectives among such advisors is important. A network
must see to it that its work is not captured, or seen to be
captured, by specific external constituencies. In our own
discussions with ICN competition agencies (especially from
transition economies), we have heard recurring concerns that
the ICN must increase participation by non-private sector
NGAs—such as academics or officials of consumer groups—to
balance the representation of NGAs from companies or law
firms.
The third step is to monitor and assess the extent of
opting-in by the ICN’s members. The ICN’s effectiveness
ultimately depends upon how fully its members integrate the
network’s recommendations into their operations. Achieving
broad agreement upon recommended practices, by itself, does
not ensure that such standards become embedded in the
practice of individual jurisdictions. This requires monitoring
and continuing encouragement to coax members to apply the
standards in practice.
The fourth step is to promote interoperability across
systems with respect to characteristics that remain dissimilar.
Even with arduous efforts to achieve convergence, substantial
differences across competition systems are likely to persist.
Notwithstanding these differences, it is important to devise
inter-agency links that facilitate routine communication and
the treatment of conduct under examination by multiple
authorities.
In pursuing the strategy set out above, progress toward
widely accepted standards will be easier to achieve in some
areas than in others. Agreement on superior methods for
effective management (e.g., the value of disclosure practices
that reveal the agency’s intentions and reasons for enforcement
decisions) may be easier to attain than agreement on some
substantive liability tests. Within the range of substantive
standards, a network is likely to find broader agreement about
18. Our view is that the ICN Merger Working Group would have achieved
dramatically lower levels of productivity without the participation of private
sector NGAs, especially lawyers experienced in counseling firms in crossborder transactions.
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the hazards of some forms of business conduct (e.g., collusive
schemes involving rival suppliers) than others (e.g., the
treatment of claims of improper exclusion by dominant firms).
In light of these differences, a successful network is likely
to have a diversified portfolio of projects. The mix is likely to
include forward-looking exercises that analyze important
economic phenomena or developments in economic or legal
theory, on the one hand, and efforts to distill theory and
experience into specific recommendations about substantive
standards, procedures, and administrative practices, on the
other hand. On the other hand, the portfolio of a network with
a greater indigenous capacity to perform policy research (e.g.,
the OECD) is likely to contain a greater number of projects and
reports that examine conceptual concerns or formative
economic conditions in detail.
One complication in assembling a portfolio of projects that
suits a network’s members arises from expansions of
membership. As a competition policy network grows, it may be
difficult to pick topics that command broad interest across the
network. Fissures may emerge on the basis of regional
differences (e.g., competition agencies in the island economies
of the Caribbean may have needs that are alien to the
landlocked nations of Central Asia) or wide gaps in
experience.19 In addition to, or as a substitute for their
participation in the large, multinational networks, some
countries might choose to focus resources competition
initiatives undertaken in the context of regional networks such
as ASEAN, CARICOM, and COMESA.
Across networks, we can expect variation in the proportion
of endeavors that emphasize theory or practice, universal
matters or more localized concerns. Despite these differences,
all networks share a common aim. All will invest significant
effort in providing a steady flow of tangible outputs. These can
include studies that shape thinking about a specific topic or
recommendations about standards. Generating a stream of
“deliverables” accomplishes several ends. For purposes of
convergence, these outputs build the structure of standards
that provide focal points for opting in by the network’s
members.
19. Older, wealthier agencies may want to discuss the latest developments in
merger simulation while a new agency may want to explore how one begins to
create a team of economists.
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A network’s outputs can vary in their significance and need
not be uniformly path-breaking. Some measures, however,
must be seen to be significant. A network is akin to a movie
studio that must produce a certain number of commercially
successful films to sustain its operations. For a competition
policy network, the equivalents of major commercial “hits”
enable the network also to turn out “indie” projects that have
real substantive merit but do not yield massive box office
revenues.
The very process of turning out recommendations also can
inspire future effort. As described more fully below,20 a
demonstrated ability to provide visible results induces network
members and NGAs to invest resources in the future.
Deliverables provide the network’s major investors with a
visible return on their commitment of resources. Multinational
competition networks are voluntary endeavors, and each
network must compete to obtain effort from its members.
Competition agencies (and the political appointees who often
head them) typically feel strong pressure to devote resources to
immediate operational needs, such as the prosecution of
cases.21 Especially in conditions of resource austerity,
investments in building an infrastructure of international
relations will tend to be seen as an appealing target for the
budget cutter’s ax.
These conditions sharpen an agency’s desire to scrutinize
the yield from its investments in international networks. A
competition authority that is dissatisfied with the output of a
network is likely to disinvest by proposing that its government
cut financial support for the network, by reducing the
involvement of top level officials, by curbing the allocation of
staff to network projects, or deciding not to attend network
functions at all. NGAs make similar calculations in deciding
whether to provide time to the network’s endeavors.

20. See infra pp. 287–88 (discussing how the willingness of member
countries to invest effort in ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD depends partly on
their perception of the capacity of these networks to deliver useful products).
21. On the tendency of competition agencies to be measured by the
volume and prominence of their cases, see William E. Kovacic, The Digital
Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the
Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10–14 (2010).
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II. THE ICN IN CONTEXT: THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION NETWORKS
International networks have gained in prominence as
forums for discussion and cooperation on competition law. The
ICN’s approach to addressing international competition law
issues is relatively flexible, informal, and non-binding. This
allows countries to participate without committing to specific
changes in law or policy.22 Continuous interaction fosters
commonly defined goals, and regulators focus more on shared
agendas instead of more narrowly defined national interests.23
In this section, we situate the ICN in the landscape of
other international organizations that have played important
roles in the development of international competition policy
standards. Before the ICN’s formation, the most important
international networks for competition policy were the OECD,
UNCTAD, and the WTO.24 We review the origins and
characteristics of these organizations and compare them to the
ICN.
One basic characteristic of the three currently active
competition networks—ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD—warrants
emphasis. In major respects, they are rivals. They are public
policy joint ventures whose principal “shareholders” are largely
the same. The major shareholders are the agencies (or
governments) that supply the bulk of a network’s budget or
otherwise play a central role in determining a network’s
effectiveness. They exercise this role by deciding to send top
management to important network events and to assign highly
capable staff to participate in the network’s activities. Every
year, a competition agency decides how much to invest in each
network: to increase resources, to reduce participation, or to
sustain existing levels of effort—in effect, to buy, sell, or hold
shares in the venture.
Individual networks prosper or decline according to their
ability to attract resources from their main shareholders.
Without a critical mass of effort by agency leaders, a network
becomes a meeting place for agency staff who lack the status to
speak authoritatively for their institutions. Moreover, if
agencies downgrade the quality of staff assigned to perform
22. See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case
Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 215–16
(2003).
23. Id.
24. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 33–39.
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research and draft network documents, the network’s work
product visibly suffers. Each network knows that its days are
numbered when top management disengages and withdraws
top quality staff from network activities.
In the framework of the multinational competition
networks, the ICN’s position in 2001 posed some significant
risks. As is the case with new entrants in commercial markets
occupied by a handful of seemingly entrenched incumbents, the
ICN had to cope with product line repositioning and sometimes
edgy resistance by the OECD and UNCTAD. The ICN’s
business model presented special potential difficulties. The ICN
portrayed itself as the fast, agile, highly maneuverable fighter
aircraft juxtaposed with the OECD’s and UNCTAD’s slow,
ungainly commercial transports. This compelled the ICN to
produce quick, visible results consistent with its institutional
vision. By contrast, the OECD and UNCTAD each enjoyed an
established and, in many cases, loyal installed base of members
and therefore had more margin for error. A large commercial
airliner can glide for a considerable distance if its engines shut
down. Turn off the engines on a fighter aircraft, and it glides
like a two-car garage.
The three existing competition networks can be seen as
suppliers of complementary policy products. Their varied
organizational forms and functions lend themselves to different
product lines. As discussed more fully below, these product
lines sometimes overlap (creating a degree of head-to-head
competition between networks). The products also can be
complementary. Of the three networks, the OECD has the
strongest capacity to generate in-depth policy research papers,
yet the ICN and UNCTAD arguably have greater ability to
disseminate policy work by reason of their more inclusive
membership policies. In the research and analysis dimension of
network performance, the OECD has a better production
facility, but the ICN and UNCTAD have superior distribution
networks. In still other areas—such as the production of
teaching materials to train new competition agency staff—it is
evident that collaboration between two or more networks might
enable them to assemble products or bundles of services whose
quality exceeds that which any single network can attain on its
own.25 As we discuss below, a major issue for the three
networks is whether they can cooperate in ways that permit
25. The authors are grateful to Sally Van Siclen for this observation.
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the realization of important complementarities.
To anticipate one of our conclusions, we see ways in which
the three networks can prosper and make important
contributions to convergence upon superior competition policy
standards. We also can imagine that the centrifugal forces of
rivalry for resources and recognition that beset the networks
could frustrate the realization of this vision. If the ventures and
their common owners cannot overcome such tensions, the
decline or outright demise of one or more of the three
competition policy networks is conceivable. Such a development
would deprive the global competition community of the benefits
of rivalry-driven experimentation that occurs today in the ICN,
the OECD, and UNCTAD and eliminate the gains that could
come from linking complementary capabilities among them.
To orientate the discussion for this section, in Table I
below we have laid out in a simplified form the characteristics
of three of the major networks: the ICN, the OECD, and
UNCTAD.
TABLE 1: THE MULTINATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY
NETWORKS
Network

Competitio
n Policy:
Status
Unit of large,
diversified
parent body

Membership

Principal
Products

Secretariat
and
Facilities

Member
Interactio
n

Governments
: economically
developed
states, plus
observers

Full-time
secretariat
in Paris HQ;
two regional
centers

Meetings
three times
annually in
Paris

UNCTAD
Competitio
n Group

Unit of large,
diversified
parent body

Full-time
secretariat
in Geneva
HQ

Annual
Meeting in
Geneva

ICN

No parent
body; sole
focus is
competition
law & policy

Governments
: no screening
based on level
of economic
development
Competition
agencies: no
screening
based on level
of economic
development

Research,
peer
reviews,
standards,
technical
assistance,
toolkits
Standards
, peer
reviews,
technical
assistance
Standards
, practical
guides and
toolkits,
workshops
for
member

Virtual body:
no physical
headquarter
s or
dedicated
secretaries

Annual
Conference;
telephone
conferences;
leadership
convenes at
OECD Paris
meetings

OECD CLPC

Table 1 captures several important features of the
networks. It helps identify key respects in which we can model
the networks as rivals, and it is a start to mapping out
complementarities that could provide useful areas for future
cooperation among the networks.
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A. THE OECD
Established in 1961, the OECD now has thirty-four
member countries.26 One of the OECD’s most important
characteristics is its membership criteria. Full participation in
the organization is confined to countries from the more
economically developed world. Although the OECD has taken a
number of measures to engage less developed economies, this
limitation served as an important reason for the creation of the
ICN, which readily made membership available to all
jurisdictions with a competition law and a mechanism for its
enforcement.27
The OECD supports economic growth and development
among its members through a variety of programs. It monitors,
analyzes, and publishes reports on macroeconomic trends and
microeconomic policy developments. Its chief operational units
consist of approximately 250 committees, expert groups, and
working groups that provide members with regular
opportunities to discuss issues of economic development and
regulatory policy. On a number of occasions, the work of the
committees has helped catalyze the formation of a broad-based
international consensus about major policy issues such as the
establishment of antitrust programs to combat cartels.28
Member countries hold decision making authority for the
OECD. As noted above, the OECD’s members are governments.
Officials from individual government agencies or departments
conduct the business of committees and working groups. The
freedom of these officials to maneuver and express their views
in these settings is not uninhibited, for they serve within the
OECD as representatives of their governments, not merely as
spokespersons for their own institutions. Member countries
usually assign an ambassador (and a substantial support staff)
to the OECD. It is common for a representative of the country’s
OECD embassy staff to observe meetings of committees or
working groups, especially if sensitive issues are on the agenda.
26. History,
ORG.
FOR
ECON.
COOPERATION
AND
DEV.,
www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761863_36952473_1_1_1_1
,00.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
27. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FACTSHEET AND KEY
MESSAGES 5 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnet
work.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (discussing ICN’s membership criteria).
28. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
Recommendations of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels (Mar. 25, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2
350130.pdf.
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When the OECD speaks as an institution and makes policy
recommendations, its views carry the force of its member
governments. Because it is a body of governments and takes
decisions by consensus, however, the path to reaching a
recommendation can be long and tortuous.
The OECD obtains its operating budget (in the current
fiscal year, approximately €350 million) from member
contributions. Member payments fund a secretariat staff of
approximately 2500;29 most staff work at the organization’s
headquarters in Paris. Among other functions, the secretariat
supports the committees and working groups. Many members
of the CLPC secretariat previously have worked in government
bodies in their home countries, and they give the OECD the indepth substantive expertise and capacity to prepare first-rate
reports on a wide array of policy issues. Although the OECD’s
CLPC secretariat is a great source of analytical strength, the
size and deliberateness of the OECD’s bureaucracy as a whole
sometimes attracts criticism.30 The perception of the OECD
administrative machinery as unduly ponderous is a major
reason for the ICN’s insistence that it is a virtual network
unencumbered by physical structures or a large, permanent
staff.31 The aversion to having the ICN establish any form of
traditional secretariat seems to stem from the fear that a
replica of the OECD’s substantial Paris campus and a laborious
pace of operations soon would follow.
The OECD began to address antitrust issues soon after its
creation in 1961 when it formed the CLPC. The CLPC has
served an important function as what some commentators have
called a “convener”—an institution that supplies a venue for
institutions to improve their understanding of other systems
and encourage cooperation.32 The CLPC provided the first
significant post-World War II international forum for members
29. See
OECD,
Who
Does
What,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
30. The CLPC is a sub-unit of the Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs, which is one of twelve OECD directorates.
31. Kovacic participated extensively in discussions about the organization
and management of ICN in its first years and recalls the determination of
many ICN members to avoid giving the new network institutional attributes
resembling those of OECD.
32. See Kirsten Lundberg, Convener or Player?: The World Economic
Forum and Davos, 1741.0 KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV. CASE STUDY 1 (2004)
(discussing how the World Economic Forum, by convening meetings of experts,
established an international policy network and helped set an agenda of policy
issues for consideration by leaders in academia, business, and government).
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to collect information on antitrust topics, to meet regularly to
discuss their experiences, and to build a network of
relationships that strengthen cooperation among different
jurisdictions.33 The CLPC’s structure today reflects the
increasing complexity of competition policy and the global
expansion of competition law systems. The Committee houses
two working parties and various outreach programs—notably,
the Global Forum on Competition—devoted to competition
issues.34 To organize and support these activities, the CLPC
draws upon a superb secretariat of administrators, researchers,
and an ensemble of external consultants.35 Member country
rankings of the OECD’s many committees routinely place
CLPC at or near the top of the ladder.36
A significant element of CLPC’s efforts to build a common
base of experience and to encourage adoption of superior
techniques is preparation of studies known as country reviews
or peer reviews. In the peer review, a member country or
OECD observer requests an examination of its competition
system, and a competition expert retained by CLPC prepares a
detailed study.37 The expert reviews published texts (e.g.
statutes,
implementing
regulations,
decisions,
policy
statements, guidelines) and conducts interviews with agency
officials and observers outside the competition agency (e.g.
academics, business associations, consumer groups, other
government bodies, and the private bar). The consultant
presents the peer review at one of the CLPC’s regular
33. See Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 37, 47 (2007).
34. See On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity, OECD (Mar.
6, 2011), http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/BBodie/ListByNameView.asp
x?book=true (including the Competition Committee, the Global Forum on
Competition, the Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, and the
Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement).
35. Some members of the CLPC secretariat are full time employees with
the rough equivalent of civil service tenure. Others have shorter-term
contracts ranging from six months to three years. In still other cases, staff are
seconded by and funded by OECD member governments. Many CLPC
consultants have served previously as members of the secretariat staff.
36. Periodic reports provided to the CLPC “Bureau”—the name given to
the committee’s governing board—indicate that OECD members routinely give
the CLPC superior evaluations.
37. See
Country
Reviews,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/competition/countryreviews (Mar. 6, 2011). The experts
who prepare the peer review studies often have extensive experience with this
exercise and are skillful observers of competition policy.
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gatherings, and officials from the agency under study respond
to questions from member countries.38 Other competition policy
networks—notably, UNCTAD—have emulated this practice
and conducted their own series of peer reviews. 39
As written, the OECD (and UNCTAD) peer reviews fall
short of being a completely uninhibited assessment of the
quality of the examinee’s competition system.40 For example, if
the examiner finds the agency’s top managers to be inept, or
the national courts to be corrupt, the peer review report will
not quite say so. The pulled punches are understandable. Only
a competition agency (or, in the case of government-based
organizations such as OECD and UNCTAD, a government)
with the highest degree of self-assurance would volunteer to
participate in a peer review that mercilessly exposed
weaknesses in a reviewed agency or the larger framework of
public administration. An analogy would be academia, where
instructors who freely dispense failing marks often find their
courses cancelled due to inadequate enrollment. On the whole,
newer agencies are relatively more welcome to unvarnished
criticism and regard peer review as an opportunity to improve
their operations. Older systems are more thin-skinned and
likely to see peer review as a potential threat rather than an
occasion to learn and grow.
The airbrushing in published peer reviews does not
undermine the essential value of such exercises. Even with
euphemisms and evasions, peer reviews are valuable tools for
identifying areas of improvement. The final written report may
soft-peddle system flaws, but the consultant ordinarily gives
the examinee a candid spoken briefing that spares nothing. The
38. In one sense, the label of “peer review” is a misnomer. As used in
academic and scientific circles, a peer review usually entails an assessment of
one researcher’s work by other researchers who are expert in the field. In the
CLPC, the principal examiner is a single expert consultant whom the
committee retains. The examinee’s true peers—other competition agencies—
participate in the review only by asking questions at the committee session at
which the consultant presents her findings. OECD member competition
systems do not perform their own study of the examinee, and their questions
frequently are scripted by the expert consultant or the OECD secretariat. The
questions posed by the panel of other competition authorities are not shared
with the examinee before the formal session.
39. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Voluntary Peer Review Process, (Mar.
6,
2011),
www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItintI=4163&lang+1
(discussing UNCTAD’s voluntary peer reviews on competition law and policy).
40. The discussion here is based on Kovacic’s experience with the OECD
and UNCTAD peer review processes.
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very effort to prepare for and participate in a review usually
causes competition agencies to reflect carefully upon its work
and thereby can stimulate improvements. Finally, the
published report’s recommendations about needed adjustments
in legislation, organization, or resources, albeit sometimes
muted, can nevertheless lend influential international support
for suggested reforms. Notwithstanding the limitations
discussed here, the OECD peer reviews supply an informative
perspective on the development of competition policy systems
over the past twenty years.
The peer review is one significant element of a portfolio of
CLPC mechanisms that facilitate convergence upon superior
substantive concepts and procedures. The regular CLPC
meetings permit members to share experiences, identify
strengths and weaknesses of existing enforcement approaches,
and discuss new developments in economic and legal theory
affecting competition law.41 In our conversations with
representatives of countries that participate actively in the
ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD, many have said that OECD
provides the best forum for in-depth exploration and debate
concerning substantive policy issues. The CLPC secretariat
prepares background papers for most sessions of the committee
and its working parties. Members regard these research studies
as a valuable resource,due to their thoughtful, balanced
analytical approach.
In some instances, CLPC programs foster consensus that
generates formal OECD recommendations.42 The OECD has
published influential recommendations and best practices
related to the appropriate treatment of specific business
practices, the relation of competition policy to other forms of
government regulation, and the means for cooperation among
competition authorities.43 The OECD policy recommendations
41. The CLPC meets in Paris three times annually—usually in February,
June, and October. In the months before each session, members receive a call
for papers on topics to be considered by the CLPC working parties and in the
committee’s plenary sessions. These requests typically elicit a substantial
number of contributions which collectively provide comparative perspectives
on substantive policy issues and a detailed compendium of enforcement
experience.
42. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 47.
43. See, e.g., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action
Against Hard Core Cartels, Org. for Econ. Co-op. and Dev. Council
C(98)35/FINAL (May. 14, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/
4/2350130.pdf; Recommendation of the Council Concerning Structural
Separation in Regulated Industries, O.E.C.D. C(2001)78/FINAL (Jun. 16,
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are non-binding. In a number of instances, member countries
do not comply with the OECD’s recommendations.44 Nor does
the OECD process move expeditiously. Many OECD projects
have proceeded at an extremely deliberate pace. This lends the
impression (and, sometimes, reveals the reality) that the OECD
cannot respond quickly and effectively to new, urgent concerns
of its members. Nonetheless, the OECD’s prescriptions
involving competition law and other areas of international
economic policy (such as efforts to discourage commercial
bribery) have encouraged discussion about potential reforms
and supported jurisdictions that are contemplating reforms.45
Compared to the ICN and UNCTAD, the OECD’s relatively
small, homogeneous membership of thirty-four developed
countries leads to an easier building of consensus, but this
advantage is double-edged.46 The lack of significant input from
the developing world can limit the perspective that informs
OECD recommendations and, in the eyes of nonmembers,
makes its prescriptions less attractive. Our discussions with
OECD officials indicate that concerns about under-inclusive
membership played a major part in the CLPC’s establishment
of the Global Forum on Competition (GFC) in the fall of 2001.47
The GFC enabled the CLPC to expand its access to a wide
range of nonmember jurisdictions, especially to transition
economies. We cannot offer a rigorous proof for the proposition,
but our discussions with OECD officials and OECD members
2003),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/49/25315195.pdf;
O.E.C.D., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Merger Review,
O.E.C.D. C(2005)34 (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/3/41/40537528.pdf; O.E.C.D. Competition Comm., Best Practices for the
Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard
Core Cartel Investigations (Oct. 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/3559
0548.pdf; O.E.C.D. Competition Comm., Guiding Principles for Regulatory
Quality and Performance, (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoe
cd/19/51/37318586.pdf; Recommendation on Competition Assessment, O.E.C.D.
C(2009)130 (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,37
46,en_2649_37463_44080714_1_1_1_37463,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
44. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 47.
45. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 281–300 (discussing the impact of
the OECD’s policy recommendations).
46. See Konrad von Finckenstein, International Antitrust Cooperation:
Bilateralism or Multilateralism?, JOINT MEETING OF THE ABA SEC. OF
ANTITRUST L. & THE CAN. BAR ASSOC. NAT’L COMP. L. SEC. (May. 31, 2001),
available at http://210.69.106.168/doc/Canada/Policy/1a.htm.
47. See
generally,
Global
Forum
on
Competition,
O.E.C.D.,
www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum (last visited May. 12, 2011)
(introducing the Global Forum). The GFC usually convenes once per year at
the CLPC’s February meeting.
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suggest that potential competition from what eventually
became the ICN also inspired the GFC’s creation.48 OECD also
has established regional competition centers in Hungary and
South Korea, in partnership with the national competition
authorities in those countries,49 and it sponsors a Latin
American Competition Forum, which hosts events for countries
in that region. These centers provide platforms for conducting
seminars and training programs for neighboring countries,
including non-OECD members.
B. UNCTAD
The United Nations created UNCTAD in 1964 to help
developing countries form and implement economic policy.50 In
the 1970s, UNCTAD suggested a “New International Economic
Order,” which involved a series of proposals designed to shift
the balance of economic power toward developing countries.51
One topic was restrictive business practices, which included the
application of competition law.52
These discussions led the United Nations to adopt in 1980
UNCTAD’s proposal, the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices (the Set).53 The UN described the Set as establishing
“broad principles and rules encouraging the adoption and
strengthening of competition legislation and policies at the
national and regional levels, and at promoting international

48. The OECD’s leadership and the CLPC management team were aware
of discussions in the late 1990s and early 2000s about the need for a new
international network to include more of the world’s competition agencies.
They knew that a reason offered for establishing a new network was OECD’s
restrictions on membership. The CLPC convened its first GFC meeting in
Paris shortly after the announcement of ICN’s creation.
49. For the centers in Hungary and South Korea, the host country county
competition agencies provide most of the funds (over 90%) for facilities and
operations. The OECD lends its name and technical expertise to the ventures.
50. See generally, U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., About UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=1
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2011).
51. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., A Brief History of UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3358&lang=1
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2011) (describing history of UNCTAD).
52. Id.
53. See Diane Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust,
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 285–86 (1992); see also, e.g., Ioannis Lianos, The
Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law,
15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 422 (2007).
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cooperation in this area.”54 The Set was unanimously adopted,
but due to its voluntary nature it did not have a legally binding
effect.55 Also limiting the impact of the Set was the reality that
at its time of establishment many nations had no competition
law, which meant that the Set was largely aspirational.56
Due in part to its nonbinding nature, the Set has not
evolved into the source of international competition law that its
creators envisioned. To a number of observers, the compromises
embedded in the Set’s preparation also robbed the document of
an important element of analytical persuasiveness and thus
impeded broad acceptance. The Set has encountered recurring
criticism that its provisions are too vague and represent the
“lowest common-denominator work product.”57
Although the Set has not served as a template for the
broad adoption of antitrust prescriptions, it has proved useful
in providing a focal point for discussion and being a stimulus
for consideration of other approaches.58 Moreover, in the
context of conferences and meetings convened by UNCTAD, the
Set and its periodic annotation have supplied an important
basis for continued international discussion about competition
law and policy issues. An Intergovernmental Group of Experts
(IGE) meets yearly to discuss approaches for improving
cooperation and convergence on competition issues.59 The IGE
also conducts debates, roundtables, and voluntary peer reviews

54. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., UNCTAD GUIDEBOOK ON
COMPETITION SYSTEMS, ati, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/2 (2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20072_en.pdf.
55. See Wood, supra note 53, at 429 (recognizing that the Set does not
have binding legal effect, but arguing that it may contribute to customary
international law on the subject).
56. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 48.
57. Id. at 104.
58. Report of the Sixth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of
the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.7/11, at 7 (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf7d11_en.pdf
(describing views of UNCTAD participants about the impact of UN Set).
59. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Intergovernmental Group of Experts
on Competition Law and Policy, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?in
tItemID=4068&lang=1 (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). These meetings tend not to
attractthe top leadership from the competition agencies of the UN’s members.
See Russell W. Damtoft & Ronan Flanagan, The Development of International
Networks in Antitrust, 43 INT’L LAWYER 137, 145 (2009) (UNCTAD’s
competition meetings “are heavily populated by resident diplomats who are
not well-versed in competition law.”).
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modeled along the lines of OECD peer reviews.60 There is a UN
conference every five years to review the Set.61 The most recent
five-year review, conducted in Geneva early in November 2010,
reveals that UNCTAD reaches an audience of developing
countries that do not participate in the OECD or ICN events.
To a large extent, UNCTAD remains the only significant forum
through which a number of low-income countries that have
recently enacted competition laws or are considering such
measures may engage in international discussions about
competition policy. This attribute gives UNCTAD an important,
unique capacity to support the development of competition
policy in nations with few, if any, links to the ICN or OECD.
The five year review held in November 2010 featured an
example of the type of innovations that have emerged from the
efforts of competition policy networks to respond more
effectively to the needs of the members. UNCTAD used the
meeting to launch a new network of academic advisors to assist
in identifying worthy projects and to provide comments on the
existing UNCTAD competition agenda. Among international
networks, UNCTAD’s initiative is the first systematic effort to
engage academics in the formulation and implementation of a
competition network’s program. Among other consequences, the
academics’ network can help UNCTAD augment its research
and analysis capabilities through a loose joint venture with
external parties.
Over time, “soft law” institutions like the ICN and OECD
may eclipse UNCTAD’s competition policy program.62 From the
time of the UN’s adoption of the Set through the 1990s,
UNCTAD acquired a reputation for expressing antagonism to
analytical perspectives that caution against various forms of
antitrust intervention or that assign preeminence to economics
as a basis for formulating a more intervention-minded
program.63 By contrast, in the past decade, however, we detect
a shift away from this orientation toward a philosophy that
encourages greater caution in some forms of competition law
enforcement and accepts more readily analytical methods
60. Id.
61. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., U.N. Conference for the Review of
the Set, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4103&lang=1
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
62. Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft
Law”, 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984–85) (examining the concept of “soft law.”).
63. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 105.
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informed by modern industrial organization economics. Some
members of UNCTAD’s core “client base”—the less wealthy
developing countries—have become members of the ICN and
have devoted progressively greater resources to ICN’s
activities.64 Others have expanded their investment in OECD
through time devoted to attendance at the Global Forum on
Competition and participation in regional events that the
OECD sponsors.65
UNCTAD’s efforts to define its place in a crowded policy
market points to a larger phenomenon within global
competition policy. The emergence of the ICN and the
establishment of competition policy projects within the context
of regional initiatives confront new authorities with difficult
resource choices.66 Many new agencies lack the resources to
assign more than one or two persons to focus on international
relations, and their budgets can support travel to a few events
each year. Compared to the ICN, the OECD and UNCTAD
have relatively greater capacity to generate funds to support
travel by less wealthy competition agencies to their meetings.
Even when a new agency receives full financial support to
attend an international event, it must decide how much time of
its small staff to commit to these endeavors. This constraint
has forced UNCTAD—as well as the ICN and OECD—to
improve the quality of their “product lines” to attract
participation.
UNCTAD resembles the OECD in that it can draw upon an
expert secretariat to support its operations. UNCTAD’s
competition policy secretariat is located on the UN’s Geneva
campus, and its core function today is to support UNCTAD’s
extensive technical assistance program. UNCTAD’s competition
policy secretariat has approximately ten professionals. Only a
64. For example, in this group we would include countries such as
Zambia, which has been an important participant in ICN activities.
65. For weakly funded agencies with small staff, attendance at
international events and participation in international networks involve major
resource commitments—even if other institutionsare paying the costs of
accommodation and transport to the foreign event. In a small, underfunded
office, the person assigned to handle international liaison matters is likely to
have other responsibilities as well. Time spent in international liaison
activities comes at the expense of performing other duties. Such agencies may
decide to participate in one or two international/regional networks only.
66. In addition to large international networks, various regional bodies
are seeking to increase their competition policy programs. These include older
regional networks such as ASEAN and CARICOM, as well as new endeavors
such as the African Competition Forum.
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few of these positions are full-time appointments within the
UN.67 UNCTAD relies heavily on short-term (six months or
less) renewable contracts. UNCTAD’s custom is to renew these
agreements, but their short nominal duration and the lack of
guarantees about renewal impede the recruitment and
retention of capable staff.
In principle, UNCTAD and OECD have access to large
reservoirs of research and know-how that each institution has
accumulated over time. The two networks have assembled a
substantial body of reports, peer reviews, internal reports on
field work, and other data dealing with the development of
competition policy in many countries. Some of this material is
in the public domain (e.g., peer reviews), but a great deal of
information either is held internally or comes in the form of
unwritten know-how. UNCTAD staff who have supervised or
conducted technical assistance programs have an especially
broad and deep perspective on the design and implementation
of capacity building projects.
To assimilate the body of knowledge accumulated by the
OECD and UNCTAD and apply it effectively to formulate
future programs is not an easy task. The pressure to prepare
for the next meeting or complete the next report tends to
deflect attention away from the mining of the historical
information base and the application of past work to new
endeavors. We suspect there are considerable gains to be had
for each network in making more effective use of what it has
learned. We can also envision considerable advantages to
having these pools of knowledge combined and used to inform
the standard-setting activities of all three major networks,
especially the ICN. There could be a division of labor in which
the OECD and UNCTAD serve as suppliers of inputs (e.g.,
detailed knowledge about past country experiences) that the
ICN cannot easily generate on its own. Doing so would require
greater integration of effort among the three networks as well
asa collaboration of efforts to map out product lines, identify
complementarities, and determine which institution is best
suited to perform specific tasks that lead to convergence upon
superior substantive standards, procedures, and administrative
techniques.
67. As described to us by UNCTAD officials, this pattern reflects more
general efforts by the UN to cope with budget constraints b y reducing the
number of full-time employees in favor of more flexible and often renewable
short-term arrangements.
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C. WTO
Created in 1994, the World Trade Organization appeared
to be a promising forum to house a multinational competition
law regime. Karel van Miert, the European Commissioner for
Competition, appointed a group of ‘wisemen’ to draft
recommendations on the subject.68 The group issued a report in
1995 encouraging the strengthening of bilateral cooperation,
but they explained that convergence and cooperation strategies
would likely be insufficient.69 The group favored, instead, the
establishment of a worldwide competition code. It was
envisaged that states would apply the code under the auspices
of the WTO.70 These findings led the EC to propose the
establishment of a Working Group on the Intersection between
Trade and Competition Policy at the WTO’s 1996 Singapore
meeting.71
The WTO working group that was eventually established
published several reports between 1998 and 2001.72 Those
reports led the WTO to issue a declaration at the WTO’s Doha
conference in 2001, positively encouraging the group’s
continuing work.73 At the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference
in Cancun in 2003, the organization suspended the operation of
the working group and dropped antitrust from its agenda.74
Similar to the criticism leveled at the UNCTAD Set, a
number of observers have suggested that a WTO agreement on
competition law would provide only a minimum set of
competition standards that would lead to nothing more than
compliance with those minimum standards. Some jurisdictions
also were concerned that the WTO enforcement body would
infringe on their own sovereignty, and expressed doubt that an
agreement was even possible between members with diverse
68. David J. Gerber, Is Reconciliation Possible? The U.S.-European
Conflict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Perspective, 33 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 123, 129 (1999).
69. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE
ORDER: STRENGTHENING COOPERATION AND RULES—REPORT OF THE GROUP
OF EXPERTS (1995).
70. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION 103–04 (2010)
[hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITION].
71. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 262–63.
72. See GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 104; see also Philip
Marsden, Competition Policy at the WTO, 1 COMPETITION L. INSIGHT 6 (Nov.
2002); Trade and Competition: Interview with Frederic Jenny, 1 COMPETITION
L. INSIGHT3 (Nov. 2002).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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national interests.75 Opposition also came from many
developing countries who thought that a competition
agreement enforced through the WTO would reflect US,
European and Japanese interests aligned to force open
developing world markets to foreign firms.76
There remains the possibility that the WTO could revive
its working group on competition law and direct the group to
return to the task of devising a framework for international
competition law.77 One condition that could support the revival
of the WTO working group is the increase since 2004 in the
number of transition economies with competition law systems
(e.g., China and Egypt) and the significant retooling of older
mechanisms in emerging markets (e.g., India and Pakistan).
An advantage that a restored working group would enjoy is
seven years of experience in the form of the ICN, OECD, and
UNCTAD efforts to build consensus and convert consensus
views into recommended standards.
D. ICN
Filling the gap for a soft law institution that included both
developing and developed nations, the ICN evolved from
suggestions by the International Competition Policy Advisory
Committee (ICPAC) formed in November 1997.78 ICPAC
researched international competition law and policy and
reported its findings in February 2000.79 The ICPAC report
advocated a soft law approach to international competition
cooperation and proposed a Global Competition Initiative.80
75. Id. at 129–37.
76. Seeid. at 134–38.
77. Id. at 129–30
COMPETITION
NETWORK,
78. History,
INTERNATIONAL
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/history.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2011). Two especially informative discussions of the ICN have
been prepared by experts who played roles in ICPAC and its recommendation
that inspired ICN’s formation. Professor Merrit Janow, who served as staff
director for ICPAC and was the principal author of the group’s report, in 2002
authored an account of the possible future relationship between ICN and the
WTO’s competition working group. See Merit Janow, Observations on Two
Multilateral Venues: The International Competition Network (ICN) and the
WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 2002 FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 49 (Barry Hawk ed., 2003). Professor Eleanor Fox,
who served as an ICPAC member, has prepared the best single review of the
ICN’s formation and subsequent operations. See Eleanor M. Fox, Linked In:
Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT’L LAWYER, 151 (2009).
79. ICPAC REPORT, supra note2.
80. See generally id. (advocating the soft law approach to international
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This led to the ICN’s formation in 2001.
The ICN has strived to distinguish itself from other
networks. One of its chief distinctive traits is the relatively
narrow scope of its substantive agenda. As described above,
antitrust is not the sole or principal concern of the OECD,
UNCTAD, or the WTO. By contrast, the ICN emphasizes that it
is the only international organization dedicated to “all
competition, all the time.”81 In the ICN, competition policy need
not battle for resources amid the many pursuits that command
attention in multi-function bodies such as the OECD82 and
UNCTAD, nor does antitrust live in the shadow of trade policy
cast by the WTO.
The ICN has espoused a single-minded focus on
competition law, yet two developments lead one to ask whether
the ICN can sustain the purity of this substantive vision over
time. One force is the need to address problems that arise
mainly in other policy domains yet have important competition
policy implications. For example, the financial crisis that began
in 2008 has stimulated far-reaching debates about the very
efficacy of the market system and the value of competition as
an ingredient of economic policy. Competition agencies must
confront the direct and indirect effects of the crisis, which,
competition cooperation).
81. ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/do
c608.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
82. OECD provides an example of the difficulties that a competition
network housed within a multi-function institution faces in defining and
sustaining a program. In recent years, we have observed how the OECD
secretariat has pushed its committees—including the CLPC—to commit
resources and meeting time to overarching projects (called “horizontal”
initiatives within the OECD) that seek to link the work of the entire OECD
committee structure and permit the organization to hold itself out as leading
an integrated analysis of specific economic phenomena or policy issues. One
recent initiative has involved the implementation of low-carbon technologies
and less environmentally disruptive strategies for achieving economic growth.
The OECD secretariat has pressed its committees to develop programs and
convene meetings concerning this “green growth” initiative. The CLPC
devoted part of its October 2010 meeting to considerations of how competition
policy might relate to the implementation of green growth strategies. The
OECD secretariat’s push for committee participation in its horizontal
initiatives could lead the CLPC to devote more time to matters with an
attenuated connection with the competition policy responsibilities of its
members. At some point, this allocation of effort could blur the identity of the
CLPC and lead members to reconsider the intensity of their commitment to
CLPC activities. OECD Work on Green Growth, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_37465_44076170
_1_1_1_37465,00.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
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among other consequences, has inspired calls for a relaxation of
traditional antitrust controls on mergers and collaboration
among competitors. This is but one area in which a network
such as the ICN must devote some time to the treatment of
pressing topical issues that arises at the boundaries of the
competition policy system.
A second factor that could blur the ICN’s competition-only
focus is the diversity of policy tasks assigned to its members. A
number of competition authorities are policy conglomerates: in
addition to antitrust law, they enforce other statutes dealing
with matters such as consumer protection and public
procurement.83 Other systems assign the competition authority
responsibility to proscribe “unfair competition”—a command
straddles the doctrinal boundary between traditional
competition law and the fields of business torts and contract
law.84 Such measures focus attention on defining the
boundaries of what forms of behavior “competition law”
encompasses. Law enforcement within jurisdictions that apply
these hybrid commands can create pressure for an expansion of
what behavior falls within the concept of competition law.85
The ICN’s membership also sets it apart from the other
international networks that address competition policy. The
member entities of the OECD, UNCTAD, and WTO are
governments, and the competition agencies which participate
in these networks speak as representatives of their respective
governments—a condition that can require a competition
agency to gain approval for its positions and initiatives from

83. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Form, Function, Performance,
and the Assignment of Regulatory Duties: Toward a Theory of the Public
Agency 44–50 (Feb. 2011) (manuscript on file with author Kovacic).
84. This is the case with Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which empowers the FTC to ban “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Ambiguity about the
reach of this measure is evident in the FTC’s settlement in N-Data (FTC 2007)
which treated an episode of post-contractual reneging as an unfair method of
competition and an unfair act or practice. FTC Challenges Patent Holder’s
Refusal to Meet Commitment to License Patents Covering 'Ethernet' Standard
Used in Virtually All Personal Computers in U.S., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/01/ethernet.shtm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
85. The ICN’s custom is to allow the host of the network’s annual
conference to place a topic of its choice on the meeting agenda. At the 2008
conference in Kyoto, the Japan Fair Trade Commission convened a panel to
discuss the application of statutes that, in the guise of competition law,
restrict the exercise of an unfair bargaining advantage in contractual
relations.
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other ministries.86 Within the ICN, the member competition
authorities have relatively greater freedom to express their
views as antitrust bodies. There is less looking over the
shoulder out of concern that the competition agency’s views
might contradict the preferences of other public institutions
within their governments. The ICN stands apart from its
multinational network counterparts in the degree to which it
engages non-government advisors (NGAs) in its work.
Compared to its main international counterparts, the ICN
relies more heavily upon the contributions of NGAs from
academia, the business community, consumer groups, and the
private bar.87 NGAs participate directly in the deliberations of
the ICN’s working groups and in the network’s conferences and
workshops; more than 100 NGAs attended ICN’s 2010 annual
conference in Istanbul.88 NGA contributions have been
indispensable to the accomplishments of some ICN projects—
such as the Merger Working Group—and it is doubtful that the
network could function on such a large scale without extensive
NGA participation.89
To date, the principal contributions have been made by
NGAs from the private sector. As noted above, this has raised
questions within the ICN about whether the network ought to
engage academics, consumer groups, and think tanks more
fully in its program.90 A second issue about NGA participation
is the selection process. For the most part, NGAs are

86. The discussion of competition law and trade policy provides an
example. Suppose the CLPC schedules a roundtable on the impact of antidumping mechanisms on domestic competition and asks members to submit
papers on their national experiences. A competition agency will know that
other major voices in government—especially those responsible for the
execution of trade-related policy—will not look favorably upon a paper that
documents how anti-dumping controls can shelter domestic firms from foreign
competition and raise prices to domestic consumers. Because it appears on
behalf of its government (and therefore must speak for a composite of
departmental views), the agency is likely to either decline to provide a paper
and thereby sidestep a controversial issue, or to write a watered-down paper
that reflects the preferences of the government’s trade bodies.
87. See Fingleton Interview, supra note 3, at 74–5.
88. This is Kovacic’s rough count based on a comparison of the conference
registration list and his observation of who attended the conference events.
COMPETITION
NETWORK,
89. See
INT’L
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). As
suggested earlier, perhaps the most influential contributions of NGAs have
occurred in the Merger Working Group.
90. See Fingleton Interview, supra note 3, at 75.
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nominated by their national competition authority (NCA).91
This gives NCAs the ability to filter out prospective NGAs on
various grounds unrelated to their expertise in competition
law. For example, we are aware of instances in which it
appears that a potential NGA has failed to gain approval from
its NCA because the NCA believed the candidate had been
insufficiently supportive of the NCA’s program.92
Another distinguishing characteristic of the ICN is that it
has strived to operate as a “virtual” network. The ICN neither
employs a permanent staff (i.e., there is no counterpart to the
OECD or UNCTAD secretariat) nor owns facilities to perform
its managerial and organizational tasks. In this respect, the
ICN has sought to separate itself from the OECD and
UNCTAD, whose impressive physical headquarters house
substantial permanent staffs.93 In place of a formal secretariat,
ICN relies on its members to contribute the time of their staff,
who form working groups in which NGAs also participate.94
Most discussions within the working groups take place via
teleconference and e-mail, with occasional face to face
gatherings.95 One estimate by the Competition Directorate of
the European Commission concluded that the ICN conducts
90% of its work by email and teleconferencing.96
Although the ICN sees itself as a virtual network, the
demands it faces in organizing its affairs are real. As the
91. See Operational Framework, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/operationalframework.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (outlining the NGA selection
mechanism).
92. Kovacic has observed the NGA selection process closely by reason of
his position as the ICN’s Vice-Chair for Outreach.
93. See e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text for description of
personnel and facilities of OECD.
94. Some ICN members have contributed substantial time and personnel.
Perhaps more than any other country, Canada has provided the closest
approximation to a formal secretariat for the ICN. For example, Canada’s
Competition Bureau has played a lead role in organizing the conference calls
that supply a vital means for the deliberations of the ICN’s governing body,
the Steering Committee. Canada has served this function both when heads of
the Competition Bureau (Konrad von Finkenstein and Sheridan Scott) chaired
the Steering Committee and when officials from other ICN members held this
position.
95. For example, most meetings of the ICN Steering Group take place by
telephone. The group also meets face-to-face at the ICN annual meeting and at
the margins of the OECD CLPC meetings in February, June, and October.
96. See Chad Damro, The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy:
Shopping for Convergence and Co-operation, 13 J. EUR. PUB POL’Y 867, 879
(2006) (describing how the ICN conducts its work).
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administrative and management tasks of the network increase,
it is fair to ask whether this virtual system of organization—
which relies on the larger, better funded competition agencies
to fulfill secretariat-like functions—will be adequate to support
the ICN. There is reason to question whether the ICN can
sustain a high level of activity without taking steps that
establish a closer equivalent to a dedicated secretariat.
The range and detailed work product that the ICN has
developed in just under a decade is impressive—especially
when you consider that all its participants have other day jobs.
Achievements have been made in many areas, including
merger review, anti-cartel enforcement, unilateral conduct,
competition advocacy, and competition policy implementation.97
Work product consists of recommended practices, case-handling
and enforcement manuals, reports, legislation and rule
templates, databases, toolkits, and workshops.98 At the most
recent annual conference alone, the ICN issued, among other
things, recommended practices for merger analysis on market
definition and failing firms, a report on refusals to deal, and
outlined plans for a virtual training program.99
The ICN develops its work product in three stages.100
Firstly, a steering group identifies an issue in need of study.101
Next, a working group is established to study the issue and,
through the course of that study, identifies the aspects of the
issue that are suitable for convergence and sets out the best
path to a more effective regulatory outcome.102 In the third
stage, the ICN working group presents its findings, and ICN
members begin to implement the suggested practices.103 To
facilitate the adoption of suggested practices, the ICN develops
templates, manuals and any other materials to assist
implementation.104
97. See
User
Guide,
INT’L
COMPETITION
NETWORK,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/vco%20toolkit%20int
roduction%20to%20icn%20april%202010%20complete.pdf
(providing
an
introduction to the structure and work of the ICN).
98. See generally INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 89 (making
the ICN work product freely available on their website).
99. ICN News Release: International Competition Network Plans for the
Second Decade, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompe
titionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc615.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
100. Sokol, supra note 33, at 111.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Compliance with recommended procedural practices should
be amenable to effective measurement. Routine monitoring of
progress toward acceptance of what the ICN has identified as
superior techniques is important to determine whether the
network is fulfilling the objective that most strongly inspired
its formation. Systematic comparisons between the ICN
standards and individual national experience can enhance
convergence as agencies become aware of differences between
their procedures and consider what is working. A huge step
forward involves enhancing the procedural best practices of
competition agencies and to assist convergence by measuring
progress. The fact that two or more countries have similar
competition law systems, however, does not necessarily reduce
the probability that each will account for different policy factors
despite substantial similarity in their procedures.105
As noted above, competition law is an inherently
evolutionary field whose development depends heavily upon
advances in learning in other academic disciplines, especially
industrial organization economics.106 Today’s superior methods
promise to be displaced by a continuous process of
decentralized experimentation in which individual jurisdictions
test specific approaches, evaluate results, and adopt
refinements
of
existing
substantive
standards
and
procedures.107 For purposes of convergence, this requires a
mechanism that entertains the testing of new techniques,
facilitates the identification of improvements in the status quo,
and thereby supplies a focal point for voluntary opting-in by
individual jurisdictions.
One possible means to this end is to improve the disclosure
of agency information that illuminates the basis for agency
decision making.108 By making the rationale for agency
105. For example, the adoption of common procedures for reporting
proposed mergers would not ensure the refusal of competition agencies to
consider policy factors unrelated to the maximizing of competition, such as the
protection of what a nation perceives to be a strategic industry.
106. See generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000)
(examining the influence of developments in industrial organization economics
on US competition law and policy).
107. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 400–02, 472–76 (2003)
(reviewing the evolutionary and experimental features of competition policy).
108. The development of a widely accepted methodology for reporting
enforcement activity would provide a more informative perspective on the
work of any single agency and would facilitate comparisons across
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decisions more observable, we can test more accurately the
extent of convergence upon the ICN’s suggested standards.
Superior disclosure practices also will cast more light on subtle
assumptions or shrouded policies that may drive agency
decisions. Improving procedural practices, therefore, could spur
greater convergence upon superior techniques in old and
nascent competition law regimes, alike.
In these and related endeavors, the ICN to this point has
attracted considerable effort from its members, many of whom
also participate in the OECD or UNCTAD, or both. Why do
competition agencies around the world work arduously to
develop recommended practices, toolkits, and other materials
that are freely available to other agencies? Commentators have
struggled with this question ever since the formation of the
ICN and other so-called Transnational Regulatory Networks
(TRNs) that involve specialized domestic officials directly
interacting with each other, often with minimal supervision by
foreign ministries.109 This question has also led them to express
doubts about the ICN’s future.110
One reason why the ICN has enjoyed success is the novelty
of competition law for most nations.111 Since they are new to
competition enforcement, new market-based systems are
looking for guidance. Rote copying of another nation’s laws is
not enough to establish an effective system of one’s own.112
agencies. See William E. Kovacic, Hugh M. Hollman, & Patricia Grant, How
Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, EUROPEAN COMP. J. (forthcoming
2011).
109. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA .J.
INT’L L. 1, 1–7 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory
Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 132–39 (2009).
110. See Lawson A.W. Hunter & Susan M. Hutton, Global Competition
Initiative: A “Headless Horseman?”-and-the Canadian Intellectual Property
Enforcement Guidelines: Convergence in Action (But Be Careful What You Ask
For….), in CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW &
POLICY 25, 25 (Barry E. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2001); U.S. and Canadian
Antitrust, inCORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW &
POLICY 45, 47–57 (Barry E. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2001).
111. See Kovacic, supra note 8, at 314–15.
112. An examination of the text of a statute says nothing about the process
of interpretation and application that give meaning to the text’s operative
terms. A first time reader of the Sherman Act might be inclined to think that
the measure’s seemingly categorical ban on contracts in restraint of trade
forbids any agreement that curbs the freedom of its parties. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2006). Since all contracts commit their parties to a course of action and
breaches are punishable by damages, one could conclude that the Sherman
Act bans all contracting. The text does not indicate that courts concluded that
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Effective enforcement in any one system builds upon an
accumulation of experience and knowhow. Instead, new
agencies are striving to learn about the practical realities of
antitrust enforcement and policy choices, which often are
accessible through one’s own experimentation or through
dialogue with more experienced agencies. The ICN provides a
highly practical forum for discussion and the requested
guidance.
Another major advantage, especially for the more mature
competition agencies, is cooperation among agencies and
convergence in antitrust policy. Cooperation between agencies
on cross-border cases reduces the risk of suboptimal
enforcement where an agency otherwise is unable to obtain
evidence from its counterpart competition authorities. Such
cooperation also can diminish the number and degree of
inconsistent outcomes when individual jurisdictions reach
different conclusions about the same practice.113 As mentioned
earlier, the concept of the ICN evolved directly from
recommendations of the International Competition Advisory
Committee that was formed in 1997 by then US Attorney
General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Joel Klein—the same year that the McDonnell
Douglas/Boeing case exposed a rift between the EU and US
competition agencies.114
III. INTERACTION WITH OTHER NETWORKS
The ICN’s presence has had an important effect on the
operation and management of other multinational networks.
the prohibition applies only to agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 44–53.
113. Greater cooperation—through information sharing and discussion of
enforcement theories—reduces the likelihood of conflict by ensuring that
agencies operate from the same basic body of factual assumptions and by
facilitating a process through which conceptual concerns are examined and
tested.
114. See FTC, [1997–2001 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,
295 (July 1, 1997) (closing the investigation into the Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas merger but observing that “[t]here has been speculation in the press
and elsewhere that the United States antitrust authorities might allow this
transaction to go forward . . . and the United States . . . needs a single
powerful firm to serve as its ‘national champion.’”). On July 30, 1997, the
European Commission concluded that Boeing had a dominant position which
would be strengthened by the merger but ended up clearing the merger on the
basis of significant commitments by Boeing. Case IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas v. Commission, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16.
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Its arrival in 2001 has helped inspire important elements of
product repositioning by the OECD and UNCTAD.
As suggested below,115 the ICN in many respects is a rival
to the OECD and UNCTAD. The three networks resemble joint
ventures that have largely overlapping, but not identical,
ownership. The chief owners of each venture are identical—the
relatively wealthy jurisdictions with well-staffed competition
agencies and active enforcement programs.116 Like investors
considering the content of their financial portfolios, these
agencies decide each year about how to invest their foreign
relations resources: to the ICN, OECD, or UNCTAD; to
regional programs with competition policy components, such as
ASEAN; to bilateral relationships with major commercial
partners; or to technical assistance projects with less
experienced competition authorities. The wealthy jurisdictions
are the main source of commitments—such as attendance by
top officials at regular network meetings, submission of high
quality written contributions for policy discussions—that
determine the success of each network’s programs.
The decisions made by less wealthy jurisdictions also can
be important. The multinational ventures exhibit network
effects: their value to each member increases as the number of
participants grows. By expanding attendance at regular
functions and increasing the range of represented interests,
broader participation by transition economies boosts the
network’s attractiveness.117 Because poorer jurisdictions have
fewer resources to commit to international matters, a decision
to participate heavily in one network may mean that the
agency ignores the others.
To attract participation by wealthy and poorer countries
alike, the multinational networks compete with each other to
115. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (describing how the ICN’s
creation has affected programs of the OECD and UNCTAD).
116. Among the most noteworthy jurisdictions in this category are
Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Korea,
US, and the UK.
117. This is perhaps most evident in the case of transition economy
jurisdictions that presently have large economies or are experiencing growth
rates that are rapidly increasing their economic significance. Such countries
have acquired, or soon will attain, considerable ability to influence crossborder commerce through the implementation of their own competition laws.
For example, the ICN would be considerably weaker if India and South Africa,
both of which have substantial economies and important competition regimes,
were not members. For the same reason, the ICN attaches great importance to
seeing China join the network.
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provide a more attractive bundle of services. The rivalry among
the networks at times has been intense. The establishment of
the ICN drew scorn from some the OECD and UNCTAD
officials, some of whom lobbied their constituencies to forego
participation in the ICN.118 The entry of the ICN into the
international network market also caused the OECD and
UNCTAD to change their product offerings. In both groups, one
observed a higher tempo of work and stronger efforts to ensure
that new programs reflected the preferences of members. Both
groups became more demand driven—a positive outcome of new
entry. The initial period of relatively acute rivalry has abated,
and the three organizations have taken initial steps toward a
division of labor that recognizes complementary aspects of their
programs and deemphasizes possibilities for substitution
among them.
A. CONVERGENCE POSSIBILITIES, SHORTCOMINGS & SOLUTIONS
It is useful to consider how much the ICN’s convergencerelated initiatives, as well as the contributions of other
multinational networks, will reduce conflicts among
jurisdictions with respect to the treatment of specific matters.
We would expect broad, voluntary opting in to substantive and
procedural standards to decrease conflicts. Widespread
adoption of similar analytical methods and procedures should
serve in many instances to guide competition agencies in
matters to the same result. At the same time, it is hard to
imagine that convergence inspired by the ICN or other
multinational networks will suffice to eliminate transnational
conflicts. Jurisdictions with similar competition regimes,
shared analytical methods, and consistent procedures
sometimes will reach different outcomes owing to variations in
application.
Even with apparent success in promoting convergence, the
certainty of future conflicts raises the question of whether the
discussion about global competition policy should include
consideration of a binding international antitrust dispute

118. Kovacic recalls the atmosphere at the OECD’s October 2001 meeting,
which followed shortly after the ICN’s launch earlier that month. Key officials
in the CLPC leadership and secretariat expressed deep concern that the ICN
would undermine the OECD by diverting the attention of OECD members
away from the CLPC and by discouraging nonmembers from participating in
OECD outreach events.

KOVACIC - Final Version

312

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/20116:19 PM

[Vol 20:2

resolution mechanism.119 As Louis Sohn and other
international law scholars have observed, voluntary
cooperation and voluntary acceptance of recommended
practices can supply a foundation for the establishment of
binding, treaty-based obligations.120 The ICN might define its
role as facilitating convergence among competition law systems
as a necessary evolutionary step from soft law to hard law—
towards the formation of a multinational competition law
agreement with binding provisions.
The concept that soft law evolves into hard law has logical
appeal. Global problems would seem to require global
solutions.121 An agreement could reduce the risk of
jurisdictional conflict and resolve conflicts that arise.122 In
addition, without an agreement, states’ interests will not align
sufficiently to resolve conflicts that arise.123
The concept of a multinational agreement has attracted
considerable attention from policymakers, practitioners, and
scholars throughout the period since World War II.124
Consideration of a framework of international competition law
has taken place in a number of fora, including the United
Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD.125 Despite these
discussions, no international treaty on competition issues has
been signed. There are bilateral and regional agreements but,
despite numerous attempts, no binding multilateral agreement.
While countries often agree on the idea of a multinational
competition agreement, the ultimate lack of success in actually
119. See Wood, supra note 53, at286–87 (demonstrating the non-binding
nature of the UN Set as one reason for the Set’s failure to become the
international competition code that its creators envisioned).
120. Louis Sohn believed progress toward international agreement
proceeded in small, incremental steps and depended on a long-term process of
engagement. Thomas Buergenthal, Note, Louis B. Sohn (1914–2006), 100 AM.
J. INT’L L. 623, 625–26 (2006).
121. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up,
Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1785–86 (2000) (stating nations
have considered transnational rules in light of growing international trade).
122. See generally Andrew Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998) (advocating for an international agreement on
antitrust issues, even though it is unlikely such an agreement could occur).
123. See Robert D. Anderson & Frédéric Jenny, Current Developments in
Competition Policy in the World Trade Organization, 16 ANTITRUST 40, 41
(2001) (articulating that antitrust conflicts will continue to arise and that
there will be difficulty resolving these issues because of national interests).
124. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 53.
125. ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 255–71.
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forming a multinational agreement has often had more to do
with geopolitical factors and timing than countries disagreeing
with the need for a multinational agreement.
1. Earlier Attempts at a Global Competition Law
Early attempts at forming a global competition law focused
primarily on eliminating the harms of international cartels
that were prevalent during the early 20th century.126
Transnational cartelization developed in waves in response to
two major destabilizing events in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. The “Great Depression” of the 1870s and 1880s led to
first wave of cartelization.127 The second wave followed the
Great War that had taken its toll on the European economies
by reducing production levels, incomes and living standards.128
In the midst of this economic uncertainty, businesses sought to
reduce their risk levels by agreeing with their competitors or
potential competitors to coordinate their production or prices.129
At the time, cartels were not perceived as necessarily damaging
to consumer welfare. To the contrary, they were considered as a
useful mechanism for achieving a more effective international
order by rationalizing economic development, reducing
overproduction, and improving the stability of workers’ jobs.130
International cartelization was a prominent issue at the
World Economic Conference of May 1927, an event that
attracted representatives from fifty countries.131 While the
objective of the conference was to identify and remove obstacles
to international trade, such as tariffs, the most recent wave of
cartelization following the Great War led to widespread debate
about the issue of cartelization.132 Discussions regarding cartels
turned out to be the most contentious of the conference.133 This
led to difficulty in drafting language and delays in generating
126. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 24.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 23.
130. Diane P. Wood, Cooperation and Convergence in International
Antitrust: Why the Light Is Still Yellow, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT:
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 177, 178 (Richard A.
Epsten& Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
131. MARTIN HILL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 47 (1946).
132. The Conference commissioned seven reports that dealt specifically
with cartels. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 27 n.23.
133. Id. at 30 & n.37.
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recommendations on the cartel issue.
At the time, European experience with antitrust and
cartels was limited.134 Germany was the only major European
country that had significant competition law experience.135 The
US had the most experience at the domestic level and had an
outright ban on cartel agreements.136 Nonetheless, the US
influence was limited as it was not a member of the League of
Nations, and US representatives only participated at the
Conference as observers.137 Many at the Conference disfavored
the US approach of outright prohibition.138 Moreover,
Europeans tended to view the US antitrust system as an illconsidered system in that it allowed industrial concentration
and encouraged mergers despite its prohibition of competition
restraints.139 Much of the generally negative view of
competition law centered on a general lack of confidence in
government, which colored the assessment of anti-cartel
proposals.140
The Conference’s final recommendation on cartels did not
establish an international competition law or supervisory
mechanism for international cartels.141 The Official Report
described the establishment of an international judicial regime
for cartels as impossible due to divergences in enforcement
between countries and general objections to such a system, but
the Conference did call for the League to collect information on
international cartels, investigate their consequences and
publish information on harmful effects.142 Despite failing to
formalize a response to cartels, this development was a major
first step toward an international response to issues presented
by a global economy.143
The economic crash of 1929 sent many of the world’s
economies into a downward spiral. The global depression
seemed to discredit reliance upon market processes and
discouraged consideration of mechanisms—such as competition
134. Id. at 36.
135. Id; see generally DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BOUND 266–333
(2001) (analyzing development of Germany’s competition policy system).
136. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 27, 35.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 35.
139. Id. at 35–6.
140. Id. at 36.
141. Id. at 30.
142. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 30.
143. Id. at 37–8.

KOVACIC - Final Version

4/22/20116:19 PM

2011] THE ICN: ITS PAST, CURRENT, AND FUTURE ROLE

315

law—associated with market-oriented economic policy.
Countries were less inclined to consider cooperative global
solutions, as evidenced by US initiatives during the Great
Depression.144 This was confirmed when the US increased its
tariffs in 1930, which led to many other countries following suit
and further contributed to the Great Depression.145
Nonetheless, following the 1927 League of Nations conference,
there was another international effort to promote global
competition law at the 27th Conference of the InterParliamentary Union in 1930.146 This organization was founded
on a cosmopolitan faith that governments working together
could improve the human condition.147 The delegates called for
states to develop a set of enforceable international competition
law principles.148 This was likely the last initiative to develop
an international competition law before the Great Depression
and Second World War put an end to cooperative international
solutions.149
2. The Havana Chapter
Apart from being major destabilizing events, the Great
Depression and Second World War demonstrated the power of
big government. In the US, the government played an active
role in righting the capsized economy and its role significantly
increased during the New Deal. The massive governmentdirected mobilization during the Second World War also
demonstrated both the power and capability of government
institutions. The expansion of the state’s role in the economy
also drew strength from scholars, such as John Maynard
Keynes, who challenged concepts of neoclassical economics that
favored relatively free markets to solve unemployment in favor
of more active government intervention in the economy through
fiscal policy.150 The increased role of government and the
144. Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the American
Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 775 (2006).
145. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 38. US domestic economic
policy from 1933 through 1935 also favored measures, such as the efforts
undertaken by the National Recovery Administration to set industry wide
codes that suppressed rivalry, that suppressed competition. See ELLIS W.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
146. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 38.
147. Id. at 38 & n.58.
148. Id. at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id. The expansion in the United States of intervention by the
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increase in forces that transcended national barriers seemed to
call for governments to cooperate to form global solutions.
With this mindset the US and its allies conceived the
Bretton Woods program during the Second World War. The
program built upon a system of new international institutions
that would provide a framework for the global economy once
the war ended.151 These institutions included the formation of
what would become the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).152 Also part of the discussions at
Bretton Woods were plans to create an international body to
improve commercial relations and foster the reconstruction of
global trade that had suffered during the Great Depression and
Second World War. The resulting institution, created by the socalled Havana Charter, was the International Trade
Organization (ITO).153
As part of the Bretton Woods program, the US circulated a
draft proposal for an international trade organization.154 The
proposal suggested that countries should “join in an effort to
release trade from the various restrictions which have kept it
small. If they succeed in this they will have made a major
contribution to the welfare of their peoples and to the success of
their common efforts in other fields.”155 There were two parts to
the proposal. The first was a collection of principles to
constitute a government code of conduct that focused on four
areas: government interference with trade (e.g., tariffs and
quotas), cartels, government commodity agreements, and
national treatment of foreign investment.156 Going further than
just setting forth a set of principles, the second part of the plan
contemplated the establishment of an international
organization to enforce those principles.157
In response to the US proposal, the UN Economic and
Social Council created a committee consisting of seventeen
government in the economy is documented in ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND
LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1987).
151. See generally Vagts, supra note 144, at 774–76.
152. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 97–98 (2000).
153. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24,
1948, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf.
154. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 126, at 43.
155. Id. at 44 n.66.
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id.

KOVACIC - Final Version

4/22/20116:19 PM

2011] THE ICN: ITS PAST, CURRENT, AND FUTURE ROLE

317

members that included more “underdeveloped” countries to
discuss and develop the US proposal.158 Despite the lack of
participation by the Soviet Union and the many concessions
made to the developing countries,159 the committee prepared a
draft. This led to a meeting in Havana in 1948 where the final
agreement was to be negotiated. Fifty-seven countries attended
the conference, and fifty-three countries ended up signing the
so-called Havana Charter in March, 1948.160 This was the last
piece of a major project to further develop several existing
international organizations.161 Most countries waited for the
US to ratify the convention before doing so themselves.162 They
considered the US as essential to the success of the ITO,
without whose contribution the ITO would be an empty shell.163
The US Congress was responsible for taking the next step
on the way to establish the ITO because Congress would have
to ratify the agreement to authorize the US to participate.164 In
April 1949, President Truman submitted the Charter to
Congress for its approval.165 By 1949, however, the political
climate, which had led to the establishment of the other
organizations conceived in the Bretton Woods program, had
changed. On the eve of a new decade, many believed that the
clash in political ideologies between the Soviet Union and US
would dominate foreign relations. Along these lines, the Soviet
Union was ideologically opposed to the capitalist ITO.166 As a
result, it appeared that fewer nations than originally hoped
would participate in the ITO. With this in mind, it seemed to
make little sense for the US to subject itself to the jurisdiction
of an international organization if it were not to realize the

158. The members of the committee were Australia, Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France,
India, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa,
Soviet Union, UK, and US. Id. at 44 n.68. See generally PETER VAN DEN
BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 79
(2005).
159. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 126, at 44 n.68, 45.
160. See WILLIAM A. BROWN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 10 (1950).
161. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 152, at 97–98.
162. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 46.
163. Id.
164. See generally William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, in 16 ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1, 1–37 (1952).
165. See BROWN, supra note 160, at 10.
166. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 46.
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benefits of a wide membership.167
US domestic politics had also changed significantly. In
1946, the Republican Party gained control of the Congress for
the first time since Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932.168
Protectionist Republicans generally took a skeptical view of
core elements of the Democratic Party’s foreign policy
program.169 In 1948, the Democrats retook the Congress by a
thin, insecure majority. The following year, China became a
communist state under Mao Tse Tung’s leadership.170 This
development, along with the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950 and continuing struggles with the Soviet Union,
reinforced the containment of communism as the chief foreign
policy priority of the US.171
Owing to these and other changes in the United States and
abroad, Wilsonian ideals of international collaboration, which
had underpinned the development of post-war international
organizations, appeared out of step with an increasingly
divided world—especially a world divided between the
ideological poles of capitalism and communism. The Truman
administration realized that Congress would not accept the
ITO proposal, and it withdrew the measure from consideration
December 1950.172 No significant attempt to establish an
international competition law would take place until four
decades later.173
The Havana Charter episode is often cited as an example of
the rejection of international competition law by the United
States and the rest of the world. Judge Diane Wood has
observed that the US objected to the Havana Charter because
its antitrust rules “were not adequate for the US, and that the
rest of the world was not yet ready to embrace a serious
antitrust regime.”174 Although a global competition law
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR TRADE POLICY 5, 130 (1996).
173. Professor Susan Aaronson’s research about the ITO negotiations
attributes the ITO’s demise to “changing international circumstances, party
politics, special-interest opposition, and Truman Administration ambivalence.”
Id. at 5.
174. Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for
the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289, 1296 (1994–95).
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appeared inappropriate for a world divided between the
ideologies of communism and capitalism, nations with marketbased economies were favorably disposed to the concept.
Nonetheless, the development of two separate systems of
economic activity—one based on markets and the other with
the state as the principal actor—led to the abandonment of
efforts to develop a multilateral framework for global
competition. It was only with the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991 that the vision of an international competition law
seemed possible once again as more countries began to
participate in the global market.
3. ICN: Possible Foundation for International Rules
Past attempts to develop a multilateral competition law
agreement have failed because they were premature in the
sense that only a relative minority of the world’s nations relied
heavily on market-based economic systems, and still fewer of
these had established competition systems. The widespread
acceptance of market processes and the creation of competition
laws in nearly 120 countries represents an important change in
the enabling conditions for a global system of antitrust rules.175
As we have discussed elsewhere, the wide acceptance of
competition policy substantive standards, procedures, and
institutions seems to occur in three stages: decentralized
experimentation within individual jurisdictions, identification
of best practices or techniques, and voluntarily opting in to
superior norms by individual jurisdictions.176 It is only now
with the continuing acceptance of the ICN’s best practices and
policies, along with those of the OECD and UNCTAD, that
countries are beginning to consider the transition from the
second to third stage: opting in to superior norms.177 The
developing world’s suspicion that competition law is simply
another means for the developed world to achieve its own
global economic aims may be dissipating. Transition economies
appear to have greater confidence that competition agencies,
working through multinational organizations, can identify,
adopt, and apply superior competition law norms in ways that
promote economic development.
175. Wood, supra note 130, at 178.
176. William E. Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence
in International Competition Policy, 97 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 309, 311
(2003).
177. See, e.g., STATEMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS, supra note 6.
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With gradual acceptance of the view that there are
superior practices concerning the substance, process, and
administration of competition law, there is an increased
likelihood that countries may decide to opt into a multilateral
agreement to achieve the benefits associated with a global
agreement on widely accepted principles. As before, the
ultimate question is whether the world has arrived at that
point. Is there a set of competition norms and best practices
that are globally accepted and may supply the basis for an
international agreement on competition law?
The ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD appear to have increased
convergence around competition law norms and practices, and
they have capacity to make further progress in the future. Of
the three, the ICN may prove to be the most effective
convergence vehicle. This possibility stems from the breadth of
its membership (an advantage over the OECD), its members’
status as agencies rather than governments (an advantage over
the OECD and UNCTAD), and its greater emphasis on
practically-oriented projects to identify and embody consensus
views in the form of recommended practices and related norms
(an advantage over the OECD and UNCTAD). The ICN’s
leadership also has developed a more complete vision of how
convergence might unfold. By thinking more systematically
about convergence and making convergence the network’s chief
priority, the ICN is better positioned to focus its resources on
achieving this end.
We would imagine that the ICN best practices and related
recommendations can serve as a precursor for future steps to
convert voluntarily adopted standards into binding
commitments. The establishment of universal substantive
commands could take place in a stepwise manner, beginning
with prohibitions on cartels. We also would expect that the ICN
network can continue to serve as a vehicle, in addition to the
work of the OECD and UNCTAD, for developing consensus
positions that become the platform for a progression that
begins with voluntary opting in and may extend to binding
commitments.
IV. CONCLUSION: ICN IN ITS SECOND DECADE
We close by emphasizing what we see to be three major
focal points for the ICN in the coming decade. The first is to
build on its past successes and continue to pursue the
identification and adoption of best practices with respect to
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substantive standards, procedures, and the administration of
competition agencies. We envision expanded efforts to evaluate
the degree of convergence in practice around the ICN’s
competition law norms and standards established by the OECD
and UNCTAD.178 The ICN’s recommendations are not binding;
no member country is obliged to adopt an ICN
recommendation. It is often unclear how much ICN members
are complying with its recommendations in practice. The
OECD and UNCTAD conduct voluntary peer reviews to provide
a more objective evaluation of various competition agencies.179
These reviews are valuable, but their findings sometimes
downplay particularly controversial issues lest countries
conclude that participation in a review will expose them to
excessively damaging criticism. The Global Competition Review
also has a ranking system but its methodology seems to be
largely based on the level of activity of each agency, and not
application and acceptance of competition law best practices.180
Possibly a better approach for encouraging convergence is
to build upon reputational and peer pressure. Nations could be
grouped depending on which competition norms they have
opted to apply in their competition law regimes. This might be
extended to include a form of nonbinding arbitration in which
panels consisting of representatives of competition agencies
offer opinions on disputes brought before them. The
continuation of contacts facilitated by the ICN, its working
groups, its workshops, conferences, and annual meeting, helps
build the level of trust and understanding that is necessary for
countries to commit themselves to participate in this or similar
forms of dispute resolution.
It may also be possible to rank the competition law regimes
according to the norms they apply and their success in actually
putting them into effect. The exact mechanism could vary but
the goal should be to establish an objective means to evaluate
competition agencies. Measurement efforts also might advance
178. The importance of evaluation as way to assess international
organizations’ effectiveness, specifically for developing countries, has been
emphasized in Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development, and International
Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 833, 848–
49 (2005).
179. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing OECD and
UNCTAD peer reviews).
180. Rating Enforcement, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., available at
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/survey/376/Rating-Enforcem
ent/.
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by the promulgation, through the ICN, of common data
reporting methods by which competition authorities would
classify and disclose information about the prosecution and
resolution of cases. Only through such objective evaluation will
it become clear the extent to which jurisdictions are converging
around a set of competition norms and processes; it will also
assist in identifying exactly which norms and processes are
considered best practices and those that are actually being
applied. If convergence is evident, then the next attempt at a
multilateral agreement on those principles and processes will
face much greater prospects for success than it has in the past.
A second desirable focal point for future ICN efforts is to
identify and make use of complementarities with the OECD
and UNCTAD. This should begin with an exercise that takes
stock of the characteristics and capabilities of all three
institutions and maps out areas of existing and potential
complementarity. This will provide a basis for the networks to
identify areas in which collaboration will improve their
collective effectiveness. The networks might strive to see how
the vast reservoirs of knowledge accumulated within OECD
and UNCTAD, embodied in reports, studies, and the experience
of the secretariats of these bodies, can be applied by all three
networks in the formulation of standards and the sharing of
knowhow across competition agencies. We see great advantages
from greater integration of effort, and we see dangers if such
integration is not forthcoming. Amid enormous pressures for
governments and their competition agencies to reduce costs, a
failure to increase the realization of complementarities could
lead to the demise or contraction competition programs within
one or more of the existing networks.
The third frontier of future work is to examine and refine
the ICN’s operational framework and determine whether its
structure and operational forms are adequate to support its
current and future programs. ICN’s founders correctly
perceived that the modern revolution in communications
technology would permit ICN to operate effectively without the
outlays for bricks and mortar and an elaborate secretariat that
supported the establishment and growth of OECD and
UNCTAD.181 In a rough sense, ICN has formed the public
181. See Kai Raustiala, The Rise of Transnational Networks Conference, 43
INT’L LAWYER 205, 207 (2009) (discussing the role of new communications
technology in spurring the development of modern transnational networks of
economic regulatory agencies).
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administration equivalent of the e-commerce business model
that has enabled modern companies to leapfrog traditional
brick and mortar distribution systems.
We salute the ICN’s inventiveness in building a strong
substantive program and realizing the possibilities for
innovation in the design and operation of a modern
international network of public agencies. We also see the major
administrative challenges that lie ahead. The absence of highly
visible physical facilities and a larger permanent secretariat,
coupled with the much professed commitment to maintain a
virtual existence, has masked the full dimensions of the
demands associated with the ICN’s operations. The ICN
network may be virtual, but the problems of resources,
financing, and management are unmistakably real. This is
especially so for an organization whose continued success will
require it to undertake still more ambitious programs, and
whose past achievements have raised expectations for future
accomplishment.
ICN’s tenth anniversary will be a good occasion to take
stock of what the operation of the network costs today and is
likely to cost in the future. This exercise will identify the
magnitude and sources of effort—by ICN members and NGAs—
that sustain the network today and will be needed for it to
carry out its plans for the future. The quality of this mundane
budgeting and planning exercise will be no less important to
the ICN’s second decade than its wise selection and
implementation of a substantive agenda.

